

EUTHYPHRO PRACTICE QUESTIONS

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page references are to

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These are exam and practice questions I have used over the years in my Intro Philosophy classes. Please feel free to make (non-commercial) educational or personal use of this material. I write them as exam questions but I use them as well to help students learn what sorts of things they should be reading for; and to help diagnose reading comprehension and informal reasoning problems.

For obvious reasons questions like these are hard to write in a conceptually and argumentatively and lawyerly air-tight manner. My policy, when I use such questions on exams, is to allow a 24-hour challenge period, during which students are encouraged to email and argue that a given question has more than one (or fewer than one) strictly defensible answer. Anyone who decides to adapt my questions for their own exam purposes would be unwise *not* to institute a similar policy.

This document is offered as-is. *Caveat emptor*. I sifted and compiled all this material from a pile of old exams, updating the Plato passages to match the translations that appear in our textbook, matching page numbers, arranging the questions so they amount to a smooth run through the dialogue. I edited them in large and small ways as I went and made a fresh key. It is altogether likely that some of the questions have debatable or unsatisfactory features. Indeed, I will be properly shocked if no typos or substantive errors have insinuated themselves. So: check my work before using it yourself. And do feel free to drop a line if you think you've found problems.

Passage 1, from Plato's *Euthyphro* (147-8; 2c-3a):

S: What charge, you ask? No mean one, as I see it, for it is no small thing for one so young to have figured out such a serious situation. He says he knows how, and by whom, the young are corrupted. More likely than not the man is wise, so when he sees my dull ignorance corrupting his whole generation, he is provoked to denounce me to the city like a child running to its mother. I think he is the only one of our public men to make a proper start in politics. One's primary concern really ought to be for the young, so they will become good men—just as it's reasonable for a good farmer to tend young sprouts first, looking after the rest later. In just this way Meletus will start off by uprooting weeds—such as myself—that damage the tender shoots of the young, as he says. Later he will obviously turn his attention to older men, thereby making himself a source of bounty and fruitful blessings for the city; a likely fate for anyone who sets out from a starting point as good as this one.

E: I hope so, Socrates, but I'm afraid it may be just the opposite. By trying to hurt you, it seems to me he makes a very crude start, cutting at the very heart of the city. But tell me, what does he say you do to corrupt the young?

Q 1

Which of the following inferences about Socrates' attitude in Passage 1 would be most reasonable? (Hint: you may rely on your knowledge of the dialogue as a whole, not just this passage in isolation.)

- A) Socrates does not think that the youth of Athens have a serious need for someone to look out for them and to make sure they receive a proper upbringing. He thinks they can look out for themselves. Meletus is wrong to meddle in their private lives.
- B) Socrates thinks Meletus is genuinely concerned with the moral character of Athenian youth. This is why he has brought suit against Socrates, though the suit is in fact groundless.
- C) Socrates doubts that Meletus is genuinely concerned with the moral character of Athenian youth. He has brought suit against Socrates to prevent Socrates from exposing his own efforts to corrupt them.
- D) Socrates thinks Meletus is likely to be wise.
- E) Socrates is perhaps serious that the young need to be looked out for first, but he is being ironic in suggesting that Meletus is the man to do this.

Q 2

Socrates declares Meletus is the only one “to make a proper start in politics.” Which of the following is the best statement of the reasons Socrates’ gives, in Passage 1, for thinking so?

- A) Socrates gives no reasons.
- B) Meletus’ primary concern is for the young.
- C) Meletus’ primary concern is for prosecuting Socrates.
- D) Meletus is a good farmer, and good farmers make good politicians.
- E) Meletus is a source of bounty and fruitful blessing for the city.

Q 3

In Passage 1, Socrates says, or implies, all of the following but one. Which one of the following does he not say, or imply?

- A) Meletus is probably wise.
- B) Socrates is dull and ignorant.
- C) Meletus is like a child running to its mother.
- D) Euthyphro is probably wise.
- E) Meletus is concerned with the education of the young.

Q 4

In Passage 1, all of the following but one plausibly describe Euthyphro’s attitude towards Socrates. Which one of the following does not?

- A) Irritated by his demand for definitions.
- B) Sympathetic on account of his legal difficulties.
- C) Respectful of his wisdom.
- D) Concerned on behalf of the city.
- E) Curious as to why Socrates has a bad reputation.

Passage 2 from Plato's *Euthyphro*, (148-9; 3b-e):

S: It sounds like an outlandish business, my friend, when you first hear it. He says I fabricate gods. He indicts me, so he says, on behalf of the old gods, whom I don't believe in, since I'm busy making new ones.

E: I see, Socrates. This is due to the divine sign you say comes to you now and again. This man has written out his indictment against you as against an innovator in divine matters. He comes to court to slander you, knowing such matters can easily be made to appear in a bad light before the crowd. That's how it is with me, too. Whenever I speak up concerning divine matters in the assembly, and foretell the future, they laugh me down as if I were crazy. Yet I have never made a prediction that didn't come true. They envy those of us with such gifts. But you shouldn't pay any attention to them. Just face them head-on.

Q 5

In Passage 2 *Euthyphro* suggests all of the following but one. Which one suggestion does he not make?

- A) That Socrates' enemies are jealous of his religious gifts.
- B) That Socrates' enemies are irritated by his philosophical arguments.
- C) That Socrates' enemies will tell lies about him.
- D) That one should not back down in the face of such critics as Socrates has.
- E) That it might be unwise to provoke such critics as Socrates has.

Q 6

In Passage 2 *Euthyphro* suggests one explanation of why Socrates is making enemies. Socrates hints that other explanations are possible. Which of the following (quoted from J.S. Mill's *On Liberty*) has the form of an alternative explanation of the sorts of reactions Socrates has gotten?

- A) The practical principle which guides them to their opinions on the regulation of human conduct, is the feeling in each person's mind that everybody should be required to act as he, and those with whom he sympathizes, would like them to act.
- B) The struggle between Liberty and Authority is the most conspicuous feature in the portions of history with which we are earliest familiar, particularly in that of Greece, Rome, and England. But in old times this contest was between subjects, or some classes of subjects, and the government.
- C) The sole end for which mankind are warranted, individually or collectively in interfering with the liberty of action of any of their number, is self-protection.

- D) Men's opinions, accordingly, on what is laudable or blamable, are affected by all the multifarious causes which influence their wishes in regard to the conduct of others, and which are as numerous as those which determine their wishes on any other subject. Sometimes their reason—at other times their prejudices or superstitions: often their social affections, not seldom their antisocial ones, their envy or jealousy, their arrogance or contemptuousness: but most commonly, their desires or fears for themselves—their legitimate or illegitimate self-interest.
- E) Both A) and D).

Q 7

The following are quotes from J.S. Mill, *On Liberty*. All of them, except one, might provide grounds for thinking the sorts of activities Socrates is being prosecuted for (per Passage 2) should be permitted. Which one does *not*?

- A) There is a sphere of action in which society, as distinguished from the individual has, if any, only an indirect interest; comprehending all that portion of a person's life and conduct which affects only himself, or, if it also affects others, only with their free, voluntary, and undeceived consent and participation.
- B) The ancient commonwealths thought themselves entitled to practise, and the ancient philosophers countenanced, the regulation of every part of private conduct by public authority, on the ground that the State had a deep interest in the whole bodily and mental discipline of every one of its citizens, a mode of thinking which may have been admissible in small republics surrounded by powerful enemies, in constant peril of being subverted by foreign attack or internal commotion, and to which even a short interval of relaxed energy and self-command might so easily be fatal, that they could not afford to wait for the salutary permanent effects of freedom.
- C) I regard utility as the ultimate appeal on all ethical questions; but it must be utility in the largest sense, grounded on the permanent interests of man as a progressive being.
- D) The great writers to whom the world owes what religious liberty it possesses, have mostly asserted freedom of conscience as an indefeasible right, and denied absolutely that a human being is accountable to others for his religious belief.
- E) The only freedom which deserves the name, is that of pursuing our own good in our own way, so long as we do not attempt to deprive others of theirs, or impede their efforts to obtain it. Each is the proper guardian of his own health, whether bodily, or mental or spiritual.

Q 8

Which of the following quotes from Mill's *On Liberty* indicates a possible line of justification for the sort of legal action taken against Socrates (per Passage 2)?

- A) No one pretends that actions should be as free as opinions. On the contrary, even opinions lose their immunity, when the circumstances in which they are expressed are such as to constitute their expression a positive instigation to some mischievous act.
- B) Apart from the peculiar tenets of individual thinkers, there is also in the world at large an increasing inclination to stretch unduly the powers of society over the individual, both by the force of opinion and even by that of legislation: and as the tendency of all the changes taking place in the world is to strengthen society, and diminish the power of the individual, this encroachment is not one of the evils which tend spontaneously to disappear, but, on the contrary, to grow more and more formidable.
- C) Those who are still in a state to require being taken care of by others must be protected against their own actions as well as against external injury.
- D) It will be said, that we do not now put to death the introducers of new opinions: we are not like our fathers who slew the prophets, we even build sepulchres to them. It is true we no longer put heretics to death; and the amount of penal infliction which modern feeling would probably tolerate, even against the most obnoxious opinions, is not sufficient to extirpate them. But let us not flatter ourselves that we are yet free from the stain even of legal persecution.
- E) Both A) and C).

Passage 3 [from an introduction to Plato's philosophy]:

As is usually the case, Socrates pushes Euthyphro into a verbal and conceptual maze from which he cannot escape. Worried by all this rather irregular talk from a notorious blasphemer, Euthyphro is very reluctant to arrive at any unorthodox conclusions, and so makes his excuses. Socrates' views, after all, are the very ones he is about to be tried for.

Q 9

Which of the following would seem to be true statements about the relationship between Passage 3 and Passage 2.

- A) Passage 3 says Euthyphro worries Socrates is a blasphemer; Passage 2 contains evidence that this is the case.
- B) Passage 3 says Euthyphro worries Socrates is a blasphemer; Passage 2 contains evidence that this is not the case.
- C) Passage 3 says Euthyphro is reluctant to reach unorthodox conclusions; Passage 2 contains evidence that this is the case.
- D) Passage 3 says Euthyphro is reluctant to reach unorthodox conclusions; Passage 2 contains evidence that this is not the case.
- E) Both B and D.

Passage 4, from Plato's *Euthyphro* (149-50; 4a-e):

S: What about your case, Euthyphro? Are you defending or prosecuting?

E: Prosecuting.

S: Who?

E: One whom I am thought insane to indict.

S: Why? Is he a flight risk?

E: He's far from able to flee; he's actually quite old.

S: Who is it?

E: My father.

S: My dear sir! Your own father?

E: Exactly so.

S: What is the charge? What is the case about?

E: Murder, Socrates.

S: Hercules! I imagine, Euthyphro, most men don't know how things ought to be. I don't think just anyone would be able to do what you are doing. This is a job for one far advanced in wisdom!

E: Yes, by Zeus—very advanced, Socrates.

S: Is it a case, then, of your father killing another relative? But I suppose that much is obvious. You certainly wouldn't be prosecuting your father for killing a stranger.

E: It's ridiculous, Socrates, for you to think it makes a difference whether the victim is a stranger or a relative. One should only consider whether the killer acted justly or not; if he acted justly, let him alone; if not, prosecute even a killer who shares your hearth and home. You are just as polluted if you intentionally remain under the same roof with a person like that, instead of purifying both yourself and him by bringing charges. The victim was a dependent of mine, and when we were farming in Naxos he acted as our servant. In a drunken rage, he killed one of our household slaves, so my father bound him hand and foot, threw him into some ditch, then sent a man here to inquire of a religious advisor what should be done. In the meantime, he didn't show any consideration to the man as he lay there bound, and neglected him, thinking that as he was a murderer it wouldn't be a big deal if he were to die—which is just what happened. He died from hunger, the cold and his bonds before the messenger came back from the religious advisor. Now my father and other relatives are furious that I am prosecuting him for murder on behalf of a murderer—when, they say, my father didn't even murder him! And besides, even if he *had* just *completely* murdered him, the dead man, being a murderer, doesn't deserve a second thought. They say it is impious for a son to prosecute a father for murder—that's how wrong they are, Socrates, about how things stand in the divine realm with respect to holiness and unholiness.

Q 10

What Socrates says in the underlined portion of Passage 4 is consistent with him believing which one of the following?

- A) It is always wrong to prosecute your father.
- B) It is never wrong to prosecute your father.
- C) It is sometimes wrong to prosecute your father.
- D) No killings are unjust.
- E) All killings are unjust.

Q 11

Euthyphro is committed to which of the following by what he says in Passage 4?

- A) It is a more serious crime to kill strangers than family members.
- B) It is a more serious crime to kill family members than strangers.
- C) It is not possible to kill a human being justly.
- D) It is possible to kill a human being justly.
- E) Both B and D.

Q 12

Which of the following is inconsistent with Euthyphro's stated views in Passage 4? (Which one of the following could Euthyphro **not** agree to without contradicting something he says in Passage 4?)

- A) Wrongful death due to negligence can constitute murder.
- B) A son should treat his father the same way he would treat any stranger.
- C) Prosecuting murderous family members is not merely right but prudent, since associating with murderers may cause you to become morally polluted.
- D) Taking the life of a human being is always wrong.
- E) Murder is always wrong.

Q 13

Suppose Euthyphro grants that parricide (father-murder) is especially horrible and should be punished more severely than other forms of murder. Suppose also that Euthyphro's relatives make the argument that to prosecute one's father for murder is attempted parricide, since the punishment for murder is death. Conclusion: what Euthyphro is doing is especially horrible. Which of the following responses would clearly be *unsuitable* for purposes of coherently defending Euthyphro's position, as stated in Passage 4, against this argument.

- A) The law should be enforced impersonally. Agents of the law cannot bend the law to favor family members. The fact that the law itself can be written to reflect the importance of family ties, by mandating extra punishment for parricide, is a separate consideration.
- B) The law is impersonal and should never reflect the importance of family ties. But agents of the law cannot be expected to set aside family feeling in deciding how and whether to enforce the law.
- C) Prosecuting murderers is not attempted murder; therefore, prosecuting one's father for murder cannot be attempted parricide.
- D) Prosecuting murderers is attempted murder; therefore murder is not necessarily wrong; therefore parricide is not necessarily wrong
- E) B) and D).

Q 14

Which of the following is the best statement of the ethical truth Euthyphro thinks Socrates is missing, in Passage 4?

- A) It is a more serious crime to kill a stranger than a family member.
- B) It is not a more serious crime to kill a stranger than a family member.
- C) In considering whether a person's act is just or unjust, it is wrong to take account of one's relationship to the person.
- D) It is not possible to kill a human being justly.
- E) It is possible to kill a human being justly.

Q 15

In Passage 4, Euthyphro commits himself to which of the following?

- I. In assessing the justice of a killing, it is wrong to take account of the killer's relationship to oneself.
 - II. In assessing the justice of a killing, it is right to take account of the victim's relationship to oneself.
 - III. It is more important to prosecute unjust killings committed by your family members than by strangers, because your family members live under the same roof with you.
 - IV. Those who associate with murderers and fail to prosecute them share, to some degree, in the pollution that afflicts the murderer.
 - V. Prosecuting murderers is partially self-interested, in that you are concerned with preventing personal pollution.
- A) I-IV.
 - B) I-V.
 - C) II, IV, V.
 - D) I, IV, V.
 - E) I, III and V.

Q 16

In Passage 4, Socrates' question and comment appear to presuppose the truth of which of the following?

- A) One would never prosecute one's father for murder.
- B) One would prosecute one's father for murder only on behalf of a relative.
- C) All killing of human beings is murder.
- D) It is not murder to kill a human being who is not your relative.
- E) Murder is always relative.

Q 17

Which of the following is/are consistent with Euthyphro's stated views in Passage 4? (Which could Euthyphro agree to without contradicting himself?)

- A) It is possible to kill a human being justly.
- B) All killings of human beings must be punished.
- C) Murderers should always be punished.
- D) Only the relatives of victims should prosecute their murderers.
- E) Both A and C.

Passage 5:

When discussing criminal guilt, the ancient Greeks often expressed themselves in terms of a notion of pollution (*miasma*). The gods hate and punish those who are 'polluted', also, those who associate (even unknowingly) with 'polluted' individuals. Thus, just as modern cities have an interest in legislating against, and ensuring clean-up of, pollution—toxic waste, hazardous dumping; so the ancient Greeks felt the city had a legitimate interest in punishing (purifying) murderers. In this way, a correct interest in seeing justice done was crossed with primitive superstition. The ancient Greeks tended to do the right thing (punish the guilty) for the wrong reason (because the guilty were covered with *miasma*).

Passage 6:

When discussing criminal guilt, the ancient Greeks often expressed themselves in terms of a notion of pollution. To modern ears, this sounds exotic and superstitious. There is no such thing as *miasma*, which drips from murderers and calls down the wrath of the gods, or the vengeance of supernatural Furies. It seems absurd to suppose guilt could be contagious, like the flu, so prohibitions against association with ‘polluted’ persons make seem particularly nonsensical. But we should recall how easily we help ourselves to similar metaphors and expressions: the murderer has ‘blood on his hands’. The criminal was caught ‘red handed’. ‘The killer’s victims cry out for justice.’ ‘I won’t let that man stay under my roof after what he’s done.’ ‘Never darken my door again!’ It may be that the ancient Greeks took their notions of pollution and contagion more literally than we take a killer’s ‘red-handedness’, etc., but there is little or no evidence that they did.

Q 18

Which of the following would *not* be reasonable inferences about how the authors of Passage 5 and Passage 6 would be likely to regard Passage 4?

- A) The author of Passage 6 would regard Passage 4 as evidence that Euthyphro is superstitious.
- B) The author of Passage 6 would regard Passage 4 as evidence that Euthyphro is not superstitious.
- C) The author of Passage 5 would regard Passage 4 as evidence that Euthyphro is wrong to prosecute his father.
- D) The author of Passage 5 would not regard Passage 4 as evidence that Euthyphro is superstitious.
- E) Both B and C.

Passage 7, from Plato’s *Euthyphro* (152; 5b):

Then the best thing that could possibly happen to me, admirable Euthyphro, is to become your student and, before the suit from Meletus starts, go offer to settle with him. I would say to him that even in the past I thought it was very important to know about divine matters, and now, since he says I do wrong by treating religious subjects carelessly and innovating in them, I have enrolled myself as your pupil. I would say to him, Meletus, if you grant that Euthyphro is wise in these matters, then grant that I have correct beliefs too, and don’t drag me into court. If you don’t grant it, sue my teacher, not me, for corrupting the old—both me and his father—by teaching me, and by admonishing and punishing his father. If he won’t buy it, and doesn’t either drop the charge, or else pin it on you instead of me, I’ll try out the same line of defense in court as I did in my settlement offer to him.

Q 19

Which of the following is the most accurate summary of Passage 7?

- A) Socrates declares himself eager to become Euthyphro's pupil on the grounds that this will help him defend himself against charges of impiety. He reasons that Meletus will consider Euthyphro to be either wise or unwise. If Meletus considers Euthyphro to be wise, he will not prosecute his pupil. If Meletus considers Euthyphro unwise, he will not blame the pupil but rather the teacher.
- B) Socrates declares his intention to become Euthyphro's pupil, since he is charged with improvising and innovating about the gods. Euthyphro, who declares himself wise in such matters, will no doubt help Socrates perfect his spiritual improvisations and innovations, thereby immunizing him from prosecution.
- C) Socrates declares that he wishes to become Euthyphro's pupil, but then he ironically points up an inconsistency in Euthyphro's position: by setting himself up as a teacher, he is committed to the view that he is both wise and not wise.
- D) Socrates ironically deflects Euthyphro's invitation to become his pupil in spiritual matters. Socrates points out that becoming Euthyphro's pupil would at best make it easy to defend himself in court. It would not make him truly wise.
- E) Socrates explains to Euthyphro why becoming his pupil would not help him defend against prosecution for impiety. Either Meletus will regard Euthyphro as wise, in which case he will not believe Socrates has the same views as Euthyphro; or Meletus will regard Euthyphro as unwise, in which case Socrates will not have helped himself by associating with him.

Q 20

All of the following are plausible statements about Passage 7 except one. Which is the one?

- A) Socrates says he wants to become Euthyphro's student because he thinks Euthyphro can teach him how to defend himself in this and any other court case.
- B) Socrates says he wants to become Euthyphro's student so he can respond more effectively to Meletus' charges.
- C) If Euthyphro's views about divinity are true, Socrates can claim to have the same beliefs. This can be a defense against Meletus' charges.
- D) If Socrates enrolls as Euthyphro's student and Euthyphro's views about divinity prove false, it will not be Socrates' fault but Euthyphro's. This can be a defense against Meletus' charges.
- E) Socrates proposes that, if he becomes Euthyphro's pupil, Meletus may be willing to settle his suit out of court.

Passage 8 from Plato's *Euthyphro* (152-3; 5c-6a):

So tell me now, by Zeus, that thing you just maintained you knew so well: namely, what is the nature of righteousness and unrighteousness, regarding murder and everything else. I take it holiness always consists in some *one* thing, with regard to every action; and unholiness is always the opposite of holiness, and the same as itself. For everything unholy always appears to us in the same form—namely as a form of unholiness.

E: Most certainly, Socrates.

S: Tell me what you say, then: what do you say holiness is, and what unholiness?

E: I say holiness is doing what I'm doing now—namely, prosecuting wrongdoers, whether the crime is murder or temple robbery or anything else, and whether the culprit is your father or mother or anyone else, and not prosecuting is unholy. And please note, Socrates, that I can point you to a certain proof—one which I have already offered to others—that this is the law and that it is right for things to turn out this way, and that we must not let a wrong-doer escape *no matter who* he might be. As it happens, these people themselves believe that Zeus is the best and most just of gods, but they admit that Zeus bound his own father for the injustice of devouring his sons—and that he in his turn castrated his father on similar grounds. Yet they're angry at me for prosecuting my father for wrongdoing! And so they contradict themselves in what they claim about the gods and about me.

Q 21

Which of the following is the best statement of the contradiction to which Euthyphro thinks his critics are committed, per the underlined bit of Passage 8?

- A) If it is wrong to prosecute one's father, what Zeus did to his father was bad and unjust. Zeus is the best and most just of gods. Ergo, if it is wrong to prosecute one's father, Zeus is both best and most just and bad and unjust. This is a contradiction.
- B) Euthyphro's critics contradict themselves in what they claim about the gods and about Euthyphro.
- C) Holiness means prosecuting wrongdoers, even your own family members. Unholiness means not prosecuting. Ergo, prosecuting one's father for wrongdoing is both holy and unholy. This is a contradiction.
- D) Everyone is mad at Euthyphro for prosecuting his father for wrongdoing, but he is doing the right thing. This is a contradiction.
- E) Euthyphro is citing a family relation—Zeus's authority as father figure—to prove that one should ignore family relations. This is a contradiction.

Q 22

Which of the following is consistent with everything Euthyphro says (in Passage 8) that his critics believe, and would explain away the apparent inconsistency in their beliefs?

- A) Zeus is the best and most just of gods.
- B) Zeus was right to prosecute his own father for wrongdoing.
- C) Zeus did not really prosecute his own father for wrongdoing. That story is just a myth.
- D) Even the best and most just of gods, Zeus, need not be infallible. When he prosecuted his father, he may have done a wrong, unjust thing.
- E) The best and most just of gods, Zeus, must be infallible. If he does something, it must always be just and for the best.

Q 23

Which of the following is the most accurate summary of Passage 8?

- A) Socrates offers a definition of 'holiness'; Euthyphro offers an alternative definition.
- B) Socrates asks for an illustration of holiness; Euthyphro offers one.
- C) Socrates asks what holiness and unholiness are; Euthyphro states that his own acts, and other similar acts, are holy.
- D) Socrates points out that Euthyphro has not defined holiness or unholiness; Euthyphro attempts a definition.
- E) Socrates asks for a definition of holiness; Euthyphro says examples will suffice to illustrate the concept.

Q 24

Which of the following is the best statement of the argument given in Passage 8 in support of the conclusion that 'holiness always consists in some one thing'? (HINT: You might read Passage 8 as containing no argument at all to this conclusion. But if it does contain an argument, it will have to be one of the following. Which one?)

- A) Holy things always appear 'in the same form'. Therefore, holiness always consists in some one thing.
- B) The law can be quoted 'as heavy proof that this is so'. Therefore, holiness always consists in some one thing.
- C) Zeus is the holiest of gods, and Zeus always appears as one thing. Therefore, holiness always consists in some one thing.
- D) You cannot define 'holiness' by means of examples. Therefore, holiness always consists in some one thing.
- E) If holiness consisted of many things, you might be able to define 'holiness' by means of examples. But you cannot. Therefore, holiness always consists in some one thing.

Q 25

Which of the following is the best statement of Euthyphro's argument in Passage 8?

- A) It is inconsistent to believe that Zeus is the best and most just of the gods, since he bound his father for unjustly swallowing his sons. No just person would do such a thing.
- B) It is inconsistent to believe that Zeus is the best and most just of the gods, since he bound his father for unjustly swallowing his sons. Therefore, those who say Euthyphro is wrong to prosecute his own father contradict themselves.
- C) It is inconsistent to believe both Zeus is the best and most just of the gods, and also to believe all the stories told about him. For it would be wrong of Zeus both to bind and castrate his father for a single crime. Yet Zeus is said to have done both.
- D) It is just for Euthyphro to prosecute his father for murder since it was just for Zeus to punish his father for murder.
- E) It is inconsistent for people to say that Euthyphro must be wrong to prosecute his father. They believe Zeus is the best and most just of the gods, and he prosecuted his father. Therefore, these people should admit it can be just to prosecute one's own father.

Q 26

In Passage 8, Euthyphro claims or implies all of the following but one. Which is the one?

- A) His critics are angry at him.
- B) His critics contradict themselves.
- C) Like Euthyphro, Zeus prosecuted his father out of reverence for the gods.
- D) Like Zeus, Euthyphro is prosecuting his father because to do so is just.
- E) Like Euthyphro, his critics believe that Zeus is the most just of gods.

Q 27

Let the following be an adequate formalization of the "certain proof" Euthyphro offers in Passage 8. (Assume, for argument purposes, that this **is** his argument.)

P1: Zeus is the best and most just of gods.

P2: Whatever the best and most just of gods does must be best and most just.

P3: Zeus punished his own father for wrongdoing.

C1: It is best and most just to punish one's own father if he has committed wrongdoing.
(from P1,2,3)

P4: If there were anyone a son had a duty to shield from prosecution for wrongdoing, it would be his own father.

C2: If it is just to prosecute even your own father for wrongdoing, it must be just to prosecute anyone for wrongdoing. (from C1, P4)

C3: We must not let a wrong-doer escape no matter who he might be. (from C2)

Which of the following steps in this argument are not explicit in Passage 8?

- A) P1
- B) P3
- C) P4
- D) C2
- E) Both C) and D).

Passage 9, from Plato's *Euthyphro* (154-5; 6c-6e):

S: My friend, you did not teach me adequately when I inquired as to what holiness is. You told me that the thing you happen to be doing at the moment—namely, prosecuting your father for murder—is holy.

E: And what I said was true, Socrates.

S: That may be. But there are lots of other things, Euthyphro, that you would also claim are holy.

E: Yes, there are.

S: Keep in mind, then, that this isn't what I asked you to do—to give me one or two examples out of the many holy actions. Rather, I asked what essential form all holy actions exhibit, in virtue of which they are holy. For you did agree all unholy actions are unholy and all holy actions holy in virtue of some shared form, or don't you remember?

E: I remember.

Q 28

Which of the following is the best statement of Socrates' objection to Euthyphro's proposed account, in Passage 9?

- A) Euthyphro says holiness is doing things like prosecuting your own father for murder.
- B) Euthyphro has only given examples of holiness.
- C) What Euthyphro has said about holiness is not true.
- D) It is not necessary to prosecute your father because 'there are many other holy actions' one might do.
- E) Euthyphro has defined 'holiness' in such a way that some actions may turn out to be both holy and unholy.

Q 29

In Passage 9, Socrates says that Euthyphro has answered his question inadequately. Which of the following Q&A sets contains an answer that makes the same type of mistake Socrates says Euthyphro makes?

- A) Q: What is a city?
A: Tokyo is a city.
- B) Q: What is a city?
A: Japan is a city.
- C) Q: What is a city?
A: A large, densely populated urban area.
- D) Q: What is a city?
A: A large, sparsely populated rural area.
- E) Q: What is an example of a city?
A: Tokyo is a city.

Passage 10, from Plato's *Euthyphro*, (154-5; 6c-e)

S: I wouldn't be a bit surprised. Someday—when you've got time on your hands—you must tell me all about it. In the meantime, try to speak more clearly about what I was asking just now. Because, my friend, you did not teach me adequately when I inquired as to what holiness is. You told me that the thing you happen to be doing at the moment—namely, prosecuting your father for murder—is holy.

E: And what I said was true, Socrates.

S: That may be. But there are lots of other things, Euthyphro, that you would also claim are holy.

E: Yes, there are.

S: Keep in mind, then, that this isn't what I asked you to do—to give me one or two examples out of the many holy actions. Rather, I asked what essential form all holy actions exhibit, in virtue of which they are holy. For you did agree all unholy actions are unholy and all holy actions holy in virtue of some shared form, or don't you remember?

E: I remember.

S: Tell me then what this form is, so that I can pay close attention to it and use it as a paradigm to judge any action, whether committed by you or anyone else: if the action be of the right form, I will declare it holy; otherwise, not.

E: If that is how you want it, Socrates, that is how I will give it to you.

S: That's what I want.

Q 30

Which of the following is the best statement of Socrates' objection, in Passage 10, to Euthyphro's account of holiness?

- A) Euthyphro has offered examples of holiness, not its essential form.
- B) The thing Euthyphro is doing is not holy.
- C) The thing Euthyphro is doing may not be holy.
- D) All holy actions are holy in virtue of some shared form.
- E) Euthyphro denies there are holy actions besides his own.

Q 31

In Passage 10, why does Socrates say he wants a general account or definition of holiness?

- A) So he can determine whether Euthyphro's examples are good ones.
- B) So he can prove that Euthyphro's examples aren't good ones.
- C) So he can offer a general account or definition of holiness.
- D) Because examples of holy actions won't serve as a paradigm to judge the holiness of other actions.
- E) Because holy actions are only useful insofar as they act as paradigms to judge the holiness of actions.

Passage 11, from Plato's *Euthyphro* (156-158; 7a-8b):

E: Well, then, what the gods love is holy; what is unloved by them is unholy.

S: Magnificent, Euthyphro! You have now answered in just the way I wanted. Whether your answer is true—that's a little something I don't know yet. It's obvious, though, that you are going to show me that what you say is true.

E: Oh, certainly.

S: Come then, let us examine our words. A man or deed loved by the gods is holy. On the other hand, a man or deed hated by the gods is unholy. They are not one and the same—in fact, they are diametrical opposites: the holy and the unholy. Isn't that so?

E: It is indeed.

S: This seems to you a sound proposition?

E: I think so, Socrates.

S: Haven't we also declared, Euthyphro, that the gods exist in a state of discord, that they disagree with each other—indeed, that they hate one another. Haven't we said this, too?

E: We did say that.

S: When hatred and anger arise, Euthyphro, what sorts of disagreements are likely to be the cause? Let's look at it this way. If you and I were to get into an argument about which of two numbers was greater, would this difference of opinion turn us into enemies and make us furious with each other, or would we sit down, count up, and quickly smooth our differences?

E: The latter, certainly.

S: Likewise, if we had a fight about the relative sizes of things, we would quickly end the disagreement by measuring?

E: That's so.

S: And we would employ a scale, I think, if we disagreed about what was heavier and what lighter?

E: Of course.

S: What sorts of things might we argue about that would make us angry and hostile towards one another, if we couldn't reach agreement? Maybe you don't have an immediate answer, but let me suggest something. See whether it isn't these things: justice and injustice, beauty and ugliness, good and bad. Aren't these the very things for causing disputes which, when we are unable to reach any satisfactory agreement, make people become enemies, whenever we do become enemies—whether you and I or anybody else?

E: That's just how it goes in arguments about such things, Socrates.

S: What about the gods, Euthyphro? If in fact they get into arguments, won't they be about these sorts of things?

E: That must be how it is, Socrates.

S: Then according to your argument, good Euthyphro, different gods consider different things to be just, beautiful, ugly, good, and bad—for they wouldn't be at odds unless they disagreed about these things, would they?

E: You are right.

S: Each of them loves what each considers beautiful, good, and just, and each hates the opposite of these things?

E: Certainly.

S: But now the very same things, according to what you say, are considered just by some gods but unjust by others. It's because they disagree with one another about these things that they quarrel and war one another, isn't it?

E: It is.

S: The same things, then, are loved by the gods and hated by the gods, and will be both god-loved and god-hated.

E: It seems likely.

S: And the same things will be both holy and unholy, according to the terms of this argument?

E: I'm afraid so.

Q 32

Which of the following is the best statement of the awkward consequence Euthyphro confronts at the end of Passage 11? His position entails:

- A) that some things will be both holy and unholy.
- B) that nothing will be both holy and unholy.
- C) that some things will be neither holy nor unholy.
- D) that some things will be either holy or unholy.
- E) that the things the gods fight about will be questions of justice and injustice, beauty and ugliness, the good and the bad.

Q 33

Which of the following is the best summary of Socrates' argument against Euthyphro, in Passage 11?

- A) Socrates tries to prove that the gods, since they are like humans, must agree about mathematics but disagree about the beautiful, the good, and so forth. This shows that the only truly pious activity is mathematics, whether one is mortal or immortal, since it is the only thing everyone can agree on.
- B) Socrates exploits Euthyphro's admission that the gods fight among themselves to prove that some gods love things that are hated by other gods. So some things are both pious and impious, which Euthyphro will not wish to grant.
- C) Socrates tries to prove that it is absurd to look to the gods for any sort of moral guidance, since some of them must be in the wrong at least some of the time, by Euthyphro's own admission.
- D) Socrates tries to prove it is absurd to suppose, as Euthyphro does, that the gods fight among themselves, since this is inconsistent with their divine status.
- E) Socrates tries to prove that everything must be both pious and impious, since every act is loved by some god and hated by some other. Therefore, Euthyphro is wrong to treat piety and impiety as mutually exclusive.

Q 34

In Passage 11, when Euthyphro grants Socrates that gods, like men, agree about mathematics but fight about right and wrong, the good, the beautiful and so forth, he does so for the following reason:

- A) Socrates has shown it would be a contradiction to deny it.
- B) Socrates advances this as an hypothesis. Euthyphro accepts it as such, pending further investigation.
- C) Socrates has suggested this view is supported by a Greek religious tradition that Euthyphro, as a priest, is bound to accept.
- D) Euthyphro does not really agree with Socrates about this. Socrates merely proceeds as though Euthyphro had granted him this point.
- E) Euthyphro simply grants the point, evidently regarding it as plausible.

Q 35

Which of the following moves/changes to Euthyphro's overall position would eliminate the awkward implication Socrates points out in Passage 11, without requiring any modification to the definition Euthyphro offers at the beginning of the passage? Euthyphro could:

- A) maintain that, in fact, the gods all love and hate the same things.
- B) maintain that, in fact, each god both loves and hates everything.
- C) deny that holiness is a function of what the gods love and hate.
- D) admit that many, and perhaps all, acts are both pious and impious.
- E) assert that the gods in fact disagree with each other about mathematics as well.

Q 36

In making his argument, in Passage 11, Socrates commits himself to all of the following but one? Which is the one?

- A) People don't become enemies because of disputes about arithmetic.
- B) People don't become enemies because of disputes about the relative sizes of objects.
- C) People can become enemies because of disputes about justice.
- D) The gods don't get in arguments about arithmetic.
- E) The gods get in arguments about justice.

Passage 12 from J.S. Mill, *On Liberty*:

The peculiarity of the evidence of mathematical truths is, that all the argument is on one side. There are no objections, and no answers to objections. But on every subject on which difference of opinion is possible, the truth depends on a balance to be struck between two sets of conflicting reasons. Even in natural philosophy, there is always some other explanation possible of the same facts; some geocentric theory instead of heliocentric, some phlogiston instead of oxygen; and it has to be shown why that other theory cannot be the true one: and until this is shown and until we know how it is shown, we do not understand the grounds of our opinion. But when we turn to subjects infinitely more complicated, to morals, religion, politics, social relations, and the business of life, three-fourths of the arguments for every disputed opinion consist in dispelling the appearances which favor some opinion different from it.

Q 37

In Passage 12, J.S. Mill could be giving reasons why what Socrates says in the underlined portion of passage 12 is true. What reasons does Socrates give for accepting what he himself says in the underlined portions of Passage 11?

- A) None.
- B) Mathematical problems must be fundamentally unlike ethical problems.
- C) The gods must be fundamentally like mortals.
- D) Ethical problems are always insoluble.
- E) Both B and D.

Q 38

If we accept what Mill says in Passage 12, and that it applies to all the things Socrates mentions in Passage 11, all of the following but one would seem to follow.

- A) Arguing that a painting is beautiful is mostly a matter of arguing against the view that the painting is not beautiful.
- B) Showing that a painting is beautiful is more complicated than solving a problem in mathematics.
- C) It is possible to have a difference of opinion about whether a painting is beautiful because there are no arguments on either side, so no objections to any given view are possible.
- D) The reason why differences of opinion about size and number are easy to settle is that it is easy to make clear that only one view of the matter is supported by reasons.
- E) Since religion is not like mathematics, it is possible to have a reasonable difference of opinion about whether gods exist, and what they are like.

Passage 13, from Plato's *Euthyphro* (159-60; 8b-d):

S: So you didn't answer my question, you man of mystery. I did not ask you for something which, while remaining one and the same, is both holy and unholy. But it appears what is loved by the gods is also hated by them. So it won't be too surprising if the thing you're doing now—namely, punishing your father—is pleasing to Zeus but hateful to Kronos and Ouranos; is pleasing to Hephaestus but hateful to Hera. And the same goes for any other gods who may disagree with one another about the matter.

E: I think, Socrates, that here we have something no god would dispute: whoever kills anyone unjustly must pay the penalty.

S: Well now, Euthyphro, have you ever heard any man arguing that one who has murdered or otherwise acted unjustly should not pay the penalty?

E: There are endless disputes about this sort of thing, both in and out of the courts, because wrongdoers will say and do anything to avoid getting punished.

S: Do they admit they have done wrong, Euthyphro, but maintain that, even so, they should not be punished?

E: No, they don't admit it at all.

S: So then they don't say or do just *anything*. For they don't presume to claim that, nor do they deny that they should pay the penalty if they did wrong. I think they just deny their guilt, don't they?

E: That's how it is.

S: Then they don't dispute *this*: wrongdoers must be punished. Maybe they just disagree about who did wrong, what they did, and when.

E: You are right.

Q 39

What explanation does Euthyphro offer, in Passage 13, as to why there are disputes about justice and injustice in the courts?

- A) He offers none.
- B) It is because there is no agreement about what justice is.
- C) It is because wrongdoers want to avoid punishment.
- D) It is because wrongdoing is hard to prove.
- E) It is because those accused of wrongdoing are sometimes innocent.

Q 40

The point Socrates is making in Passage 13 is most analogous to which of the following?

- A) Scientists may argue about which theory is best. But they never dispute that the best theory should be accepted.
- B) All arguments about justice and injustice – about murder, for example – are merely disagreements about the meanings of words.
- C) If you call something ‘a rose’, then it is a rose by definition. If you call something ‘murder’, it is murder by definition.
- D) All scientists agree that the best theory should be accepted. From the fact that they nevertheless disagree about what the best theory is, it follows that there is no best theory.
- E) All scientists dispute that the best theory should be accepted. And, since there is no theory that is in fact accepted by everyone, it follows that no theory is best.

Q 41

Which of the following is the best statement of Socrates’ main point, in Passage 13?

- A) Wrongdoers must be punished.
- B) Wrongdoers must be punished whether they admit their crimes or not.
- C) Whether someone does wrong depends on whether he/she admits wrongdoing.
- D) Even wrongdoers admit wrongdoers must be punished, but not all wrongdoers admit they do wrong.
- E) Everyone admits wrongdoers often refuse to admit that the things they do are wrong.

Passage 14, from Plato’s *Euthyphro*, (160-1; 9a-9d):

S: Come now, my dear Euthyphro; tell me, that I may be the wiser for it, what proof do you have that all gods deem this man unjustly killed—this servant-turned-murderer, bound by the master of his victim, who died in bondage before his captor learned from the seers what was to be done about him—and that all gods consider it right for a son to denounce and prosecute a father on behalf of such a person? Come, try to show me clearly that all the gods definitely believe this action to be right. If you can demonstrate this adequately I will sing the praises of your wisdom forevermore.

E: Perhaps this is no small task, Socrates—though I could show you very clearly indeed.

S: I quite understand that you think I’m dull-witted compared to the jurors, since obviously you are going to show them that these actions are unjust and hated by all the gods.

E: I will show them very clearly, Socrates, if only they will listen to me.

S: They will listen so long as you seem to be speaking well. But something occurred to me while you were talking, a thought I am even now turning over in my mind: Suppose Euthyphro does show me conclusively that all the gods consider such a death unjust. To what extent will he thereby have taught me the nature of holiness and unholiness? That such a deed is hated by all the gods—so much would seem to follow. But a definition of holiness and unholiness does not, for what is hated by the gods has also been shown to be loved by them.

Q 42

The first underlined portion of Passage 14 is ironic because:

- A) Socrates does not really think Euthyphro thinks he (Socrates) is dull-witted, compared to the jurors.
- B) Socrates clearly has no confidence that Euthyphro can ‘obviously’ show the jury what he says he can.
- C) Socrates’ precise narration of all the facts about the murder shows he is more a master of the details of the case than Euthyphro himself.
- D) Socrates thinks there are no clear answers to questions about the nature of justice, so he cannot think Euthyphro will ‘obviously’ show this thing.
- E) Both A and B.

Q 43

In the second underlined portion of Passage 14, Socrates raises an objection. Which of the following is the best characterization of the form of the objection.

- A) Euthyphro says he can answer a certain question, but what we really want is an answer to a different question.
- B) Euthyphro’s arguments all rest on suppositions. But why should we accept those?
- C) Euthyphro will not manage to show that ‘all the gods consider such a death unjust.
- D) Euthyphro is confusing justice and theology. He assumes that if the gods love something it is just. But why shouldn’t it be the other way around? If something is just, the gods love it?
- E) Even if Euthyphro shows that ‘that such a deed is hated by all the gods,’ he will not have shown that all the gods hate injustice.

Q 44

In the underlined bit of Passage 14, Socrates claims that Euthyphro must think he (Socrates) is dull-witted compared to the jury that will hear Euthyphro's case. What justification for this claim does Socrates provide?

- A) Socrates provides no justification.
- B) Socrates claims to have received a clear sign from the gods that he is dull-witted.
- C) Socrates is asking for a clear sign from the gods that he is dull-witted.
- D) Socrates is asking for a clear sign about what the gods believe, but Euthyphro thinks only dull-witted people believe in clear signs from the gods, and dull-witted people should not be allowed to sit on juries. So Euthyphro must think Socrates is dull-witted, compared to a jury.
- E) Euthyphro finds it hard to make Socrates see something that he expects to be able to make a jury see clearly. So Euthyphro must think Socrates is dull-witted compared to a jury.

Q 45

In Passage 14, Socrates makes which of the following objections to Euthyphro's claims?

- A) It seems to follow from what Euthyphro says that all the gods consider such a death unjust. But that cannot be demonstrated.
- B) It seems to follow from the fact that all the gods consider such a death unjust that all the gods will love Euthyphro's prosecution of his father. But that cannot be demonstrated.
- C) Euthyphro has not managed to show that all the gods consider such a death unjust.
- D) Even if Euthyphro shows that such a deed is hated by all the gods, he still will not have provided an account of the nature of holiness.
- E) Even if Euthyphro shows that such a deed is hated by all the gods, he will not have shown that all the gods hate injustice.

Passage 15, from an Introduction to Plato's philosophy (this section directly precedes Passage 3):

The *Euthyphro* is a dialogue between Euthyphro and Socrates as they stand outside the Athens courthouse. Socrates is about to be tried and condemned to death, and yet still finds the time to discuss the crucial distinction between a morality based on religious belief and one based on philosophical reasoning. Socrates shows that it is almost impossible to derive a consistent moral code from the gods. They continually quarrel and it is never possible to please all of them all of the time.

Q 46

All of the following, except one, are examples of gods-derived moral codes that would be consistent—or at least not inconsistent for the reason cited by the author of Passage 15. Which is the one?

- A) The morally right thing to do is whatever the most powerful god wants you to do.
- B) The morally right thing to do is whatever the majority of the gods want you to do.
- C) The morally right thing to do is whatever the gods want you to do.
- D) The morally right thing to do is whatever the god of justice wants you to do.
- E) The morally right thing to do is please as many gods as you can, while angering as few as you can.

Passage 16 [continuing from where Passage 15 leaves off]:

Most importantly, though, Plato (or is it Socrates) gets Euthyphro to admit a crucial difference. What is morally right is not necessarily always pious ... religion is loveable because it is loved, and morality is loved because it is loveable.

Passage 17, from Plato's *Euthyphro* (164; 11a):

Socrates: But if that which is god-beloved and that which is holy were one and the same, dear Euthyphro, and if the holy were *loved because it was holy*, then what is god-beloved would be loved by the gods because it was—god-beloved!

Q 47

Let's suppose that, in Passage 16, 'religion is loveable because it is loved' could be paraphrased 'holy things are only loved because they are god-beloved.' Which of the following is the best statement of what Socrates is pointing out, in Passage 17, about this explanation of the nature of religion?

- A) It is true.
- B) It is consistent.
- C) It is Euthyphro's view.
- D) It is Socrates' view.
- E) It is circular.

Passage 18, from Plato's *Euthyphro* (163-4; 10d):

S: What then do we say about holiness, Euthyphro? Surely that it is loved by all the gods, by your account?

E: Yes.

S: Is it loved because it is holy, or is there some other reason?

E: There is no other reason.

S: It is loved then because it is holy, but it is not holy because it is loved?

E: So it seems.

Q 48

In Passage 18, Socrates gets Euthyphro to commit to which of the following?

- A) What the gods love must be both holy and unholy.
- B) Holy things must be so independently of the gods' love, since it is holiness that causes the gods to love these things.
- C) Holy things are made holy by the gods' love.
- D) It would be possible for the gods to hate holy things, as well as love them, since it is not the gods' love that makes things holy.
- E) The gods have no reason to love anything unless it is holy.

Passage 19, from Plato's *Euthyphro* (continuing on from Passage 17; :164-5; 11a):

But now you see we have two quite different sorts of cases here—very different from one another. We have someone who loves a thing, making it be loved; and we have a lovable thing, which makes someone love it. I'm afraid that when I asked you what holiness is, Euthyphro, you didn't want to make its nature clear to me. Instead, you told me about one of its properties—namely the property holiness has of being loved by all the gods.

Q 49

All of the following, except one, are plausible paraphrases of what Socrates is getting at, in Passage 17 and Passage 19. Which one of the following is he clearly **not** saying?

- A) The nature of holiness must be an essential sort of lovability, distinct from any facts about who loves it.
- B) If 'holiness' just means what loved by all the gods, nothing will turn out to be holy; because the gods quarrel about everything.
- C) Euthyphro's account makes it incoherent to suppose the gods have a reason for loving holy things; but this is absurd.
- D) The fact that all the gods love holy things can be an effect of the nature of holiness, but cannot be that nature itself.
- E) Both A and B.

Q 50

Complete the following sentence so it becomes a plausible analogy to Socrates' point about the nature of holiness, in Passage 19. Let holiness be analogous to winning. (You work out the rest.)

If every winner gets a gold medal, then ...

- A) having a gold medal is a property of all winners. Nevertheless, 'gets a gold medal' is not an account of what it means to win.
- B) having a gold medal is a necessary condition of being a winner. To provide a necessary condition for a thing is to give an account of its nature.
- C) having a gold medal is a sufficient condition of being a winner. To provide a sufficient condition for a thing is to give an account of its nature.
- D) there must be agreement as to what constitutes being a winner.
- E) both B and C.

Q 51

Per the terms of the analogy in Q 50: if holiness is analogous to being a winner, then a gold medal must be analogous to what?

- A) Philosophy.
- B) The gods.
- C) The gods' love.
- D) Holiness.
- E) Both C and D.

Passage 20, from Plato's *Euthyphro* (165-6; 11c-e):

E: But Socrates, I can't possibly explain to you what I have in mind, because every time we advance some proposition it runs around in circles somehow, refusing to stay where we put it.

S: Your propositions, Euthyphro, seem like the works of my ancestor, Daedalus. If it were me stating them and setting them forth, you might make fun of me, saying that, due to my relation to him even my works in words run away from me and won't stay where they're put. As it is, these propositions are yours, so we need some other joke—they really won't stay put, as you yourself have noticed.

E: I think that joke suits our discussion well enough, Socrates, because I'm not the one making these things wander around and fail to remain in one spot. I think you're the Daedalus here, because they would have stayed put if it were up to me

S: Then it looks as if I must be even more terribly clever than Daedalus, my friend, since he set only his own creations in motion, while I have apparently animated both my own and those of others. And the pinnacle of my genius is that I am clever without wanting to be, for I would give up the wealth of Tantalus as well as the cleverness of Daedalus, if only my words would stay and remain fixed in one spot.

Q 52

In Passage 20, Euthyphro and Socrates make a comparison between Daedalus' statues (which were so lifelike they came to life and walked around) and something else. Which of the following is the best statement of what the statues are compared to?

- A) Socrates' cleverness.
- B) Socrates' cleverness, minus his desire to be clever.
- C) Euthyphro's dilemma: whether he should prosecute his father.
- D) Euthyphro's view that prosecuting his father is pious.
- E) Euthyphro's various attempts to provide a general account of holiness.

Passage 21, from Plato's *Euthyphro* (166-7; 12a-12c):

S: Pull yourself together, my good man, because the thing I'm saying is not that hard to grasp. I am saying the opposite of what that poet said, who wrote:

Zeus, who has brought all that to pass, and made it grow, you will not name/ For where there is fear there is also shame.

I disagree with the poet. Shall I tell you why?

E: Please do.

S: I don't think that where there is fear there is also shame, for I think many people who fear disease and poverty and many other things feel fear but are not ashamed of what they fear. Don't you agree?

E: I do indeed.

S: But where there is shame there is also fear. For is there anyone who feels shame and contrition about some matter, who does not at the same time fear and dread a reputation for wickedness?

E: He will fear it.

S: Then it isn't right to say, where there is fear there is also shame, rather that where there is shame there is also fear. But shame is not everywhere that fear is, since fear covers a wider area than shame. Shame is part of fear, just as odd is part of the concept of number—from which it follows that it isn't true that where there is number there is also oddness, rather that, where there is oddness there is also number. Do you follow me now?

E: Absolutely.

Q 53

Which of the following would be a counter-example to Socrates' claims in Passage 21?

- A) Lee is afraid of spiders and ashamed of being afraid of spiders.
- B) Lee is afraid of spiders and ashamed to tell anyone he is afraid of spiders.
- C) Lee is ashamed of his fear of spiders, and afraid others will find out he is afraid of spiders.
- D) Lee is ashamed of his fear of spiders, but not afraid others will find out about his fear.
- E) Lee is not ashamed of his fear of spiders, but is fearful others will find out he is afraid.

Q 54

Which of the following is the best statement of why Socrates thinks what the poet says cannot be true, in Passage 21?

- A) The poet only gives examples of fear, rather than a proper definition.
- B) The poet only gives examples of shame, rather than a proper definition.
- C) There are counter-examples to the poet's claim.
- D) Shame causes fear, so fear cannot be the cause of shame.
- E) Fear does not cause shame, so shame can be the cause of fear.

Passage 22, from Plato's *Euthyphro* (167; 12d):

S: This is the kind of thing I was asking about before: where there is justice, must there be holiness? Or is it rather that where there is holiness, there is also justice, since justice is not coextensive with holiness—holiness is a part of justice? Shall we say so, or do you think otherwise?

E: No, that's fine; I think what you say is right.

Q 55

By agreeing with Socrates in Passage 22, Euthyphro is committing himself to a position inconsistent with which of the following? (Which can Euthyphro *not* agree to without contradicting himself?)

- A) If something is unjust, it is unholy.
- B) If something is unholy, it is unjust.
- C) To decide questions of justice, it is sufficient to consider what religion commands.
- D) To decide questions of justice, it is insufficient to consider what religion commands.
- E) A and C.

Passage 23, from Plato's *Euthyphro* (continuing from Passage 22; 167; 12d):

S: See what comes next: if holiness is part of justice, we must, it seems, find out what part of justice it might be. Now if you asked me a similar question about the thing I just mentioned—what part of the concept of number is even, and what kind of number it was, I would say: a number which can be divided evenly, rather than unevenly, by two. Or don't you think so?

E: I do.

Q 56

In Passage 23, Socrates can be read as making all of the following analogies but one. Which is the one?

- A) Justice is like holiness.
- B) Justice is like number.
- C) Holiness is like evenness.
- D) Holiness is like a kind of number.
- E) Divisibility by two is like the essence of holiness.

Passage 24, from Plato's *Euthyphro* (168; 12e-13b):

E: I think, Socrates, that piety and holiness are that part of justice concerned with the care of the gods, while the part of justice concerned with the care of men comprises the rest.

S: What you say seems excellent, Euthyphro, but I'm still unclear on one *tiny* point. I don't yet know what you mean by 'care', for you don't mean care of the gods in the same sense as care of other things. We say, for example—don't we?—that not everyone knows how to take care of horses, only the horse-breeder does.

E: Yes, I do mean it that way.

S: So the art of horse breeding is the care of horses.

E: Yes.

E: Nor is it the case that everyone can care for dogs, but the hunter knows how.

E: That is so.

S: So the art of hunting is the care of dogs.

E: Yes.

S: And that of cattle-raising the care of cattle.

E: Quite so.

Q 57

Which one of the following does Euthyphro deny, by implication, in Passage 24?

- A) Holiness is a kind of justice.
- B) Justice is a kind of holiness.
- C) Justice is a matter of taking care of things.
- D) Justice is not a matter of taking care of things.
- E) Both B and D.

Passage 25, from Plato's *Euthyphro* (continuing on from Passage 24; 169; 13c):

S: So dogs are benefited by the art of hunting, cattle by the art of cattle-raising, and so on and so forth. Unless you have some notion that care aims at harming the thing cared for?

E: By Zeus, no.

S: It aims to benefit the object of care?

E: Of course.

S: Is holiness then—being the care of the gods—also a benefit to them, something that makes the gods better? Would you agree that when you do something holy you improve some one of the gods?

E: No, by Zeus, I would not!

Q 58

The question and answer exchange in Passage 25 can easily be read as an argument that Euthyphro should accept a particular conclusion. What is the conclusion? (HINT: Treat the passage as isolated for question purposes. The argument is part of the dialogue as a whole, but the question doesn't ask what you think Euthyphro is being pressured to accept overall.)

- A) That holiness does not benefit its objects.
- B) That holiness benefits its objects.
- C) That care of animals and care of gods must be distinct kinds of care.
- D) That one should not compare gods to animals.
- E) That holiness cannot be care of the gods.

Q 59

In Passage 25, Euthyphro finds himself committed to an unacceptable conclusion by his acceptance of two propositions. Which of the following is the best statement of those two propositions?

- A) Holiness is care of the gods; Care benefits its objects.
- B) Holiness is not care of the gods; Holiness benefits its objects.
- C) Holiness is care of the gods; Holiness benefits its objects.
- D) Dogs are benefited by the art of hunting; gods are benefited by the art of holiness.
- E) Hunting is an art; holiness is an art.

Passage 26 from Plato's *Euthyphro* (continuing where Passage 25 leaves off; 169-171; 13b-14b):

S: So, the art of holiness and piety is the care of the gods, Euthyphro. Is that what you mean?

E: It is.

S: Doesn't each of these types of care aim at the same result? I mean something like this: it aims at some good or benefit to the thing being cared for. Just as you see that horses, when they are cared for, gain some benefit and are made better. Or don't you think so?

E: I do.

S: So dogs are benefited by the art of hunting, cattle by the art of cattle-raising, and so on and so forth. Unless you have some notion that care aims at harming the thing cared for?

E: By Zeus, no.

S: It aims to benefit the object of care?

E: Of course.

S: Is holiness then—being the care of the gods—also a benefit to them, something that makes the gods better? Would you agree that when you do something holy you improve some one of the gods?

E: No, by Zeus, I would not!

S: I didn't think that was what you meant—quite the contrary—but that's why I asked what you meant by 'care of the gods'. I couldn't believe you meant this kind of care.

E: Quite right, Socrates. I didn't mean this kind of care at all.

S: Very well, but what kind of care of the gods would holiness be?

E: The kind of care, Socrates, that slaves take of their masters.

S: I understand. Holiness is shaping up to be a kind of service to the gods.

E: Exactly.

S: Could you tell me: what is the *goal* that service to a doctor serves to bring about? Don't you think it would be health?

E: I think so.

S: What about being of service to shipbuilders? What goal would that service aim to accomplish?

E: Clearly, Socrates, the building of a ship.

S: And as to being of service to housebuilders: the goal would be houses?

E: Yes.

S: Tell me then, my good sir, what is the point of the service men provide to gods? You obviously know since you say that you, of all men, have the most complete knowledge of divinity.

E: And I speak the truth, Socrates.

S: Tell me then, by Zeus: what magnificent result is it that the gods achieve when they employ us as servants?

E: Many fine things, Socrates.

S: And the same goes for generals, my friend. All the same, you would not have any trouble telling me that the main point of what they do is to achieve victory in war. Isn't that so?

E: Of course.

S: Farmers too, I think, produce many fine things, but still, the main point of what they do is to bring forth goods from the earth.

E: Quite so.

S: Well then, what is the main point of the many fine things that the gods achieve?

E: I told you just a little while ago, Socrates, that it is no easy matter to arrive at precise knowledge of these things. Nevertheless, to put it simply, I say that if a man knows how to please the gods in word and deed—with prayer and sacrifice—then his are holy actions that support and sustain private houses and public affairs alike. The opposite of these pleasing actions are unholy, and overturn and destroy everything.

Q 60

In Passage 26, Socrates' analogies aim at forcing Euthyphro to admit which of the following?

- A) If you know how to please the gods, then your actions are holy.
- B) If holiness is service to the gods, it must benefit them, or facilitate some divine project.
- C) Holiness must benefit the gods, or facilitate some divine project.
- D) If service to the gods does produce some good, it cannot be holy.
- E) If service to the gods does not produce some good, it cannot be holy.

Q 61

What awkward consequence is Euthyphro trying to avoid, by shifting from talk of 'care of the gods' to talk of 'service to the gods', in Passage 26?

- A) Holiness helps the gods achieve great things.
- B) Holiness improves the gods.
- C) Holiness does not help the gods achieve great things.
- D) Holiness does not improve the gods.
- E) Holiness puts humans in a relationship to the gods that is like slavery.

Passage 27, from Plato's *Euthyphro* (173-4; 15c):

You surely remember how, a little while ago, we said that holiness and what is loved by the gods were not the same, but distinct from one another. Or don't you remember?

E: I do.

S: Don't you see that now you are saying that what is dear to the gods is what is holy? Is this the same as what is loved by the gods, or isn't it?

E: It certainly is.

S: Either we were wrong about what we agreed to before, or—if we were right then—we're wrong now.

E: That seems to be so.

Q 62

Which of the following is the best statement of Socrates' objection to Euthyphro, in Passage 27?

- A) 'What is loved by the gods' means the same as 'what is dear to the gods'.
- B) Euthyphro said holiness is what is loved by the gods. Now he says it is what is dear to the gods.
- C) Euthyphro has not explained what the difference is between 'being loved by' and 'being dear to'.
- D) Since Euthyphro has reached a conclusion inconsistent with one reached earlier, one of the two conclusions must be mistaken.
- E) Since what is holy and what is loved by the gods are two different things, Euthyphro is wrong to conclude that what is dear to the gods is what is holy.

Passage 28, from Plato's *Euthyphro* (174; 15c):

S: So we have to begin again at the very beginning, to investigate what holiness is. And I won't willingly give up before I figure it out. Don't think me unworthy; instead, concentrate your attention to a supreme degree and tell the truth. For you know this thing, if any man does, and so I will clutch you as tightly as if you were Proteus himself, until you tell me. If you did *not* know precisely what is holy, and what unholy, you would never have undertaken to prosecute your aged father for murder on behalf of a servant. You would have been afraid to risk the wrath of the gods, in case you should be acting wrongly, and you would have felt shame before your fellow men. As it stands I am certain you believe you know *precisely* what is holy and what not. So tell me, my good Euthyphro, and don't keep secret what you think it is.

Q 63

In Passage 28, Socrates expresses the opinion that if anyone knows what holiness is, it has to be Euthyphro. What is Socrates' states reason for thinking so?

- A) Socrates gives no reason.
- B) Euthyphro must know what holiness is.
- C) Euthyphro must know what holiness is, because he thinks Socrates is unworthy.
- D) Euthyphro must know what holiness is, because only a holy man would be justified in prosecuting his own father.
- E) Euthyphro must know what holiness is, because you would not prosecute your own father unless you were sure it was not wrong to do so.

Passage 29, from *Reason and Persuasion*, Chapter 2 (18-19):

Socrates' negative questioning method is called *elenchus*, which just means *refutation* ... You ask a question. You get an answer. You ask a follow-up. You get another answer. Eventually you have the makings of a contradiction and you hang your debating partner from that hook. His friends laugh at him, perhaps, and you have taken one more step towards unpopularity. For example, in *Euthyphro* the priest wants to maintain the following:

- 1) What the gods love is holy. What they hate is unholy.
- 2) Different gods love and hate different things.
- 3) Nothing can be both holy and unholy.

Lay them out like that and it's obvious: they don't fit. The truth of 1 plus 2 implies the falsehood of 3. (Zeus loves what you are doing, so it is holy. Kronos hates it, so it is unholy. So it is holy *and* unholy.) Logicians say: 1-3 is an inconsistent set. But how does the discovery that your beliefs are inconsistent help you become wiser? You wise up by clearing up the contradiction, obviously. But how do you do *that*? Euthyphro decides he wants to hold onto 3, so he tries to modify 1 and 2. But he could have gone the other way. In general, how can you know you haven't dropped the *true* and kept the *false*. It is easy to form a consistent set of false propositions. No contradiction is implied. All the pieces fit, but the picture they show isn't *true*. It seems the only way to use *elenchus* as a method for becoming wise—for attaining knowledge of anything—is by having at least some knowledge to begin with. Some touchstone of truth. Some secure point you can build out from, testing other beliefs as you go.

Q 64

Which of the following is the best statement of the point the author is making in Passage 29?

- A) The way to become wise is to clear up contradictions. *Elenchus* clears up contradictions. Therefore, *elenchus* should make us wise.
- B) The way to clear up contradictions is to employ *elenchus*. Socrates clears up contradictions. Therefore, Socrates employs *elenchus*.
- C) It is easy to form a consistent set of false propositions. Therefore, it is likely that we believe consistent sets of false propositions.
- D) *Elenchus* only tests for consistency. If we want the truth, we need something more than *elenchus*.
- E) At least one of Euthyphro's beliefs must be false, because they form an inconsistent set.

Passage 30, continuing on from Passage 29:

Let's consider the matter practically, in terms of what has come to be known as the Socratic method: teaching by questioning. Teachers who employ this method do not lecture but ask questions, which students must answer. Sometimes it is suggested this works for questions to which there is no one "right" answer. But that can't be quite right. No one bothers to apply the Socratic method to answers to "what is your favorite color?"-type "no right answer" questions. There may be something to the notion that the Socratic method is especially well-suited to The Big Questions, to which there are no final, absolute answers. But there must be better and worse answers, in some solid sense, or the method has no point. Pedagogically, the idea must be that students won't understand how and why better answers *are* better except by seeing what was wrong with what they were first inclined to say. This approach corresponds, roughly, to Socrates' method of roughing up his fellow citizens, when they get puffed up with a sense of wisdom. But there is a difference, apparently. A teacher who conducts her class this way had better know better than her students. Teachers who set questions like traps along wrong paths, or trail them like breadcrumbs along more promising ones, had better know which is which. You don't teach by asking questions at random. For their part, the students need to have some notion of what the subject is about, as opposed to having no notion whatsoever. They need to have ideas bad enough that they stand in need anything out of a truly empty head. The students' beliefs need to touch down on the truth, need to be half-right to start with. The teacher must see and seize on this point of promising contact, firm it up, expand it.

A Socratic teaching style must straddle right and wrong (better and worse) ways of thinking in specific and often delicate ways.

It isn't exactly easy to teach this way.

So who does Socrates—this man of no special wisdom—think he is, employing such a delicate method?

Q 65

The underlined portion of Passage 30 asserts that 'there is a difference'. (At least apparently.) What is the difference, according to the passage?

- A) Socrates apparently lacks any 'special wisdom', whereas teachers today have to 'know better' than their students.
- B) Socrates' taught by questioning, whereas teachers today teach by lecturing.
- C) Modern teachers who employ the Socratic method are 'roughing up' their students, who are too 'puffed up with a sense of wisdom'. Socrates used the method for a different purpose.
- D) Unlike Socrates, who targeted those too 'puffed up with a sense of wisdom', teachers today who employ the Socratic method are not 'roughing up' their students, to humble them.
- E) The method that Socrates employed was 'specific and often delicate' in ways that the methods of modern teachers who use the Socratic method are not.

the KEY

Q 1	E	Q 56	A
Q 2	B	Q 57	E
Q 3	D	Q 58	C
Q 4	A	Q 59	A
Q 5	B	Q 60	B
Q 6	E	Q 61	B
Q 7	B	Q 62	D
Q 8	E	Q 63	E
Q 9	E	Q 64	D
Q 10	C	Q 65	A
Q 11	D		
Q 12	D		
Q 13	E		
Q 14	C		
Q 15	C		
Q 16	B		
Q 17	E		
Q 18	D		
Q 19	A		
Q 20	A		
Q 21	A		
Q 22	D		
Q 23	C		
Q 24	A		
Q 25	E		
Q 26	C		
Q 27	E		
Q 28	B		
Q 29	A		
Q 30	A		
Q 31	D		
Q 32	A		
Q 33	B		
Q 34	E		
Q 35	A		
Q 36	E		
Q 37	C		
Q 38	C		
Q 39	C		
Q 40	A		
Q 41	D		
Q 42	E		
Q 43	A		
Q 44	E		
Q 45	D		
Q 46	C		
Q 47	E		
Q 48	B		
Q 49	B		
Q 50	A		
Q 51	C		
Q 52	E		
Q 53	D		
Q 54	C		
Q 55	E		