Let me see if I can deprive Andrew Sullivan of the straw at which he still clutches. He writes:
The question I have asked myself in the wake of Abu Ghraib is simply the following: if I knew before the war what I know now, would I still have supported it? I cannot deny that the terrible mismanagement of the post-war - something that no reasonable person can now ignore - has, perhaps fatally, wrecked the mission. But does it make the case for war in retrospect invalid? My tentative answer - and this is a blog, written day by day and hour by hour, not a carefully collected summary of my views - is yes, I still would have supported the war. But only just. And whether the "just" turns into a "no" depends on how we deal with the huge challenge now in front of us.
There are two distinct questions Sullivan might be asking and answering.
1. Is there any excuse for having supported this failure?
Retrospectively, was there a sufficient case for war to make it at least reasonable to advocate it? In Sullivan’s terms: ‘was the case for war valid?’ Answering ‘yes’ is obviously consistent with saying the war has, in the event, proved a terrible, unrecoverable strategic error, i.e. we are no longer hoping to ‘succeed’ – politically, militarily, morally, otherwise - but are at best cutting losses. History – military history in particular – is littered with the sorry spectacle of reasonable, ‘valid’ cases gone to hell. But losers like to console themselves with excuses, and strict fairness affords them this wound-licking privilege. Far be it from me to dock it, if justly invoked.
2. Is there still hope for success?
In light of all that has happened, is there any way to aim from this point on at a weighing of rights and wrongs, goods and bads, such that there will be more right and good than wrong and bad? Can the benefits still outweigh the costs? If not, there is no hope for success (understood in a perfectly natural way. Dunkirk was a success, but we aren’t presently taking the term in such a way as to cover ‘grand loss-cutting measures.’)
Sullivan is answering ‘yes’ to 1, and I think he is answering ‘yes’ to 2. His ‘just barely’ covers 2 as well as 1. But the answer to 2 is ‘no’. This has been clear for some time, and Abu Ghraib is really just extra coffin nails. The only reason to answer 'yes' to 2 is if you mistake it for 1.
In fact it seems to me 1 is hard to answer 'yes' to, but maybe I'm unhealthily recoiling away from it after a long and unhealthy infatuation. I see that Jacob Levy and even Matthew Yglesias are willing to undertake conditional defenses of 1. I'll bow to their wisdom. But a ‘yes’ answer to 2 is wrong, because we cannot FROM HERE ON OUT reasonably hope that benefits will outweigh costs. The most we can hope – I hope we all hope it – is that the Iraqi people will be better off after all this is over. Those who aren’t dead or tortured will have more freedom, dignity, prosperity and hope than they would have had without the war. (This is not a foregone conclusion. The place may descend into civil war and chaos. It is very hard to do worse than Iraqis did under Saddam. But in time of civil war it would not be impossible.)
But isn’t freedom for 25 million people (discounting for risk) a fine thing, a not inconsiderable sum to enter in the credit column?
Yes, but it doesn’t weigh up against a thousand coalition dead, and rising, and countless tens of thousands of Iraqi dead and maimed, $200 billion and counting, lost friends, sunk diplomatic capital, sunk honor and morality and dignity and a great deal else. Opportunity squandered is a very kind and merciful term for all this truly precious stuff that’s not coming back for a generation or more.
There is, after all, such a thing as opportunity cost, though the term has an unfortunate classroom air about it when part of what you are discussing is dead bodies stacked like cord wood. It is simply too obvious to bear arguing - is it not? - that $200 billion, and everything else thrown in, could very easily buy more than we have any reasonable hope to get for it from here on out.
I suspect most readers of this post will find this relatively obvious. But in the days and weeks to come, with folks like Sullivan peeling off of Bush, it will be useful to force the issue of 1 vs. 2 where applicable. Any tendency to pass off a vague sense that the whole thing was excusable as a vague argument that success is still possible, i.e. benefits may still exceed costs, ought to be exposed for the slip that it is.
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