From Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, §6:
Gradually it has become clear to me what every great philosophy so far has been: namely, the personal confession of its author and a kind of involuntary and unconscious mémoires; also that the moral (or immoral) intentions in every philosophy constituted the real germ of life from which the whole plant had grown. Indeed, if one would explain how the abstrusest metaphysical claims of a philosopher really came about, it is always well (and wise) to ask first: at what morality does all this (does he—) aim? Accordingly, I do not believe that a “drive for knowledge” is the father of philosophy; but rather that another drive has, here as elsewhere employed knowledge (and mis-knowledge!) as a mere instrument. But anyone who considers the basic drives of man to see to what extent they may have been at play just here as inspiring spirits (or demons and kobolds—), will find that all of them have done philosophy at some time—and that every single one of them would like only too well to represent just itself as the ultimate purpose of existence and the legitimate master [Herrn] of all the other drives. For every drive is domineering [herrschsüchtig]: and as such it attempts to philosophize.— To be sure: among scholars who are really scientific men things may be different—“better,” if you like—, there you may really find something like a drive for knowledge, some small independent clockwork that, once well wound, works on vigorously without any essential participation from all the other drives of the scholar. The real “interests” of the scholar therefore lie usually somewhere else, in his family, say, or in making money, or in politics; indeed, it is almost a matter of total indifference whether his little machine is placed at this or that spot in science, and whether the “promising” young worker turns himself into a good philologist or an expert on fungi or a chemist:—it does not characterize him that he becomes this or that. In the philosopher conversely, there is nothing whatever that is impersonal; and above all his morality bears decided and decisive witness to who he is—that is, in what order of rank the innermost drives of his nature stand in relation to each other.
As F. H. Bradley says: Metaphysics is the finding of bad reasons for what one believes on instinct.
In a part II of my dialogue (not included in the draft I linked in that previous post) S & P mull the advantages and disadvantages of defending 'theory' by aligning it with this Nietzschean vision of philosophy. Aristocracy becomes personal authenticity. Argufying for your personal sensibility turns out to be par for the philosophy course. Intellectual conscience turns out to be a shallow - at best, an instrumental virtue. (So theory's lack of it is no great loss.) Unsystematic systematicity - eclecticism - is a natural and predictable product of clashes between our inner drives. (Anything else would indicate your heart wasn't in it.) There is, additionally, nothing journalistically feuilletonistic about having one's
philosophy be a chorus of howls from an inner oligarchy of daimons,
kobolds and sundry spirits. (You can even rename them race, gender and class and impersonalize them socially and culturally.) The passage effectively affirms settling your moral conclusions in advance. Last but not least, you get to bash analytic philosophy as no true philosophy, just a sort of callow clattering with impersonal machines. Any takers for this line of defense? Perhaps the aptly named Me?
I think there is something seriously tempting about this line of defense for 'theory'. Because I think there is something right about what Nietzsche is saying. Even so, I don't think it's healthy to grip the Nietzschean nettle too tightly. What do you think? [Obviously it's no simple matter to work out how this passage relates to others in Nietzsche. Yes, I'm aware he is a complicated fellow - a veritable pandaimoniacal parliament.]
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