You keep using that word. I do not think it means what you think it means.

Follow-up to last night's post. I have said one thing that is peculiar about Zizek is how little he engages with liberalism, either as philosophical theory or (one might say) as actually existing liberalism. And when he does engage with liberalism, the things he says often seem to me straightforwardly mistaken (i.e. so wrong that they probably aren't even seriously intended. Just rhetorical flourishes.) Jodi Dean says no, he has serious things to say about liberalism. Here she links to a couple of her papers. But she has a post up that seems to me to show she isn't sufficiently familiar with philosophical debates about liberalism to be a good judge. She went to a talk and took this away as an argument against it:

The nutshell version is an is to ought problem: you can't get from the is of conflicting values to the ought of a duty to recognize and accomodate the conflict.

I can imagine how this point - commonly deployed in arguments about relativism - can move you in various potentially interesting directions. Admittedly, I wasn't at the talk. But Dean says that "even this crude version is compelling." Against liberalism? How so? 

On the liberal's own terms (of neutrality vis a vis competing conceptions of the good and/or a principled approach to value difference). So, unless a liberal is willing to concede a higher order value, violence, or cultural specificity (all of which conflict with the basic premise of neutrality toward competing conceptions of the good) liberalism comes up against its fundamental antagonism (ok, this is not liberal language but I couldn't resist a Zizekian jab). So, here is an argument raised in the language of liberalism: liberalism can't defend itself here.

But liberalism need not be neutral vis a vis competing conceptions of the good. (I don't know what 'a principled approach to value difference' means. Could mean any number of things, none of them obviously distinguishing marks of liberalism. So I pass.) And of course liberalism not just concedes but takes its stand on a higher order value: liberty. (Does liberalism 'concede violence'? Again, unclear. 'Cultural specificity?' Does liberalism fail to notice it is 'culturally specific' in at least some ways. I find it hard to see how it could miss such an obvious fact. Is there any reason to suppose it does?) And again we are back to neutral vis a vis conceptions of the good. But why say liberalism must be that? Of course letting people pick their own goods is a stock liberal position, but the accent tends to fall more on the 'letting people pick' than neutrality about goods. Liberals frequently think people ought to be free to pick what the liberals themselves think are really worse goods. The harm of paternalism taken to outweigh the benefits of intervention in these cases. Then the bizarrely strong hint (to my ears) that somehow 'liberalism can't defend itself here'? Even if you thought there were a major school of liberal philosophy committed to denying the ought-is thing - I doubt there is - you should be aware that there are at least some versions of liberal philosophy that don't rest on anything of the sort.

Consider this relatively short, quite clear Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy entry about liberalism. I don't think it's utterly authoritative, but I mostly agree. Value pluralism is considered, as one prominent liberal view of value. And it is one, no question. And the requisite point is made about it:

But in themselves, such notions of the good do not constitute a full-fledged liberal ethic, for an additional argument is required linking liberal value with norms of equal liberty. [This is Dean's point, I take it.] To be sure, Berlin seems to believe this is a very quick argument: the inherent plurality of ends points to the political preeminence of liberty (Kocis: 1980). Guaranteeing each a measure of negative liberty is, Berlin argues, the most humane ideal, as it recognises that ‘human goals are many,’ and no one can make a choice that is right for all people (1969: 171). But the move from diversity to equal liberty and individual rights seems a complicated one; it is here that both subjectivists and pluralists often rely on versions of moral contractualism. Those who insist that liberalism is ultimately a nihilistic theory can be interpreted as arguing that this transition cannot be made successfully: liberals, on their view, are stuck with a subjectivistic or pluralistic theory of value, and no account of the right emerges from it.

OK, there's your argument right there. John Gray stuff. Maybe that's what Dean heard at the talk. But the important thing to see here, I think, is that the simple version, 'value pluralism does not entail a duty of tolerance,' is uncompelling as an argument against even a few forms of liberalism. Isaiah Berlin is a foxy fellow and nothing so crude will work against him. But he is really your best target. And getting every liberal pinned with this crude thing? You need some heavy duty argumentation. You need to get up to your elbows in varieties of liberalism. (Check out a couple John Gray books for starters, maybe.) Precisely what Zizek seems uninterested in doing.

If I may hazard a diagnosis of what has gone wrong here: the 'liberalism' Dean is thinking of is not really a philosophical theory at all but a sort of mushy multiculturalist reflex; that is, a form of incoherent relativism, vulnerable to very simple, standard lines against relativism. (Zizek gripes about such mushy multiculturalism, I know. Hence I hypothesize Dean's adoption of these gripes.) There is nothing wrong with targeting relativist mush, but labeling it 'liberalism' is pretty confused.

And on that note I expect I'll shut up about Zizek and move over the The Valve to post some book reviews. Unless some really interesting debate develops here ...

Comments

[Rich Puchalsky]

John, I do think that Zizek and his defenders like Jodi Dean have a certain point here. You write that: "You need some heavy duty argumentation. You need to get up to your elbows in varieties of liberalism." But there are liberal values embedded in that reply. According to Zizek, you *don't* need argumentation, you *don't* need thought, all that you need to do is condemn and obfuscate, and the liberal insistence on rationality and tolerance and looking at things fairly is so much hogwash that is a priori bad because it leads to the neoliberal order.

I don't know why you have trouble with this concept. Zizek doesn't think like you do, and there is no reason to expect him to. The standard disease of liberals is to try to argue with people who have indicated that they have no interest in argument.

[Keith]

I think one of the problems arises from the fact that there is no coherent liberal ideology. Unlike Conservatism, which has a core ideology and a list of talking points, plus a hierarchy to enforce them, Liberalism is actually a broad category tearm used, these days, to describe everything west of Reganomics and historically, anything that fell in-between Anarchism/Communism/Socialism on the left and Conservatism/Fascism on the Right. Liberalism is a broad term in that it has a list of categorical traits that may or may not apply to any individual or group that gets tossed into the category. Inherent contradictions arrise when people like Zizek try to paint everyone in an ad-hoc category as being part of a monolithic movement.

This problem arises from one of the inherent faults of the Conservative mindset: there must be a head, a body and a single goal because this sort of hierarchical inheritance is the only power structure that Conservatives recognise (which explains why we invaded states like Afghanistan and Iraq in order to fight stateless terrorists. You can't actually wage a war on terror, so you fall back into the standard categories, and start looking for states that will substitute for the real threat).

Zizek wants to look at Liberalism as if it were the result of Chairman Mao and Emma Goldman sitting down and hashing out plans for world domination, appointing leaders and issuing orders to their minions, simply because this is the only sort of arrangement they can conceive of. That it is an oversimplification and a fantasy is besides the point.

[baa]

John,

I think you've basically pegged it. Two further remarks.

1. Isn't it likely that by "liberalism" Zizek really means the neoliberal political/economic order? Isn't the tyrany of the mulinationals public enemy #1 these days, not Ronald Dworkin or whatever? If so, Zizek's argument becomes even weaker, as neoliberalism as political-economy can be supported my multiple philosophical traditions. As a for instance, neoliberalism in this sense has supporters ranging from utilitarians to Straussians (and David Frum!).

2. There is a form of liberalism against which something like the Dean move is effective. Let's call this liberalism "crude Rawls." Whether or not Rawls himself was ever at any point a crude Rawlsian is a good question, but certainly crude Rawlsianism did exist as a powerful strand of academic liberalism. Lots of people said (and still say) that the magic of the original position shows that liberalism can start out with a presumption of value neutrality and generate substantive norms. Tackling this mistake is old hat, and if Zizek wants credit for being the 20th man on the pile, fine.

[abc]

'I think you've basically pegged it'

Just so you know, in England 'pegged it' means 'died'. I take it you're not using it in that sense.

[abc]

Now John,

Could you kindly point me in the direction of a definition of Liberalism that you agree with (broadly). This is, just so y'know, a genuine request.

[abb1]

John,
Could you point to a clear description of one form of liberalism that - in your opinion - doesn't suffer from this 'relativist mush' problem while still maintaining, as you say, its stand on a higher order value: liberty. Can such a thing exist without being immediately denounced by other liberals as a terrible perversion, as we see now with this 'neoliberalism' variety.

Thanks.

[abb1]

Oh, sorry, I didn't see that the request has already been made.

[baa]

Here's another version of "pegged" I did not mean!

At what point will 50% of colloquial English also be filthy?

[Jodi]

The paper I heard and turned into a quick summary was an academic paper that dealt with Berlin and some other contemporary American political theorists who extend the work of Rawls. The theorist who gave the paper orients his work in Wittgenstein and has nothing to do with Zizek. His (they guy who gave the paper) interest was in criticizing the notion of value pluralism in contemporary liberal political theory (again, an extension of debates around Rawls, particularly the later Rawls). In that literature, as well as in the comments of communitarian critics in the debates of the 80s, the idea of neutrality vis a vis competing conceptions of the good is a major theme and item of debate. It has nothing to do with mushy multiculturalism. Indeed, some of the liberal defenders of this notion of neutrality (especially as they extend it into a theory of deliberative democracy, and I have in mind here Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson)are quite critical of mushy multiculturalism on other grounds. The emphasis on value pluralism is also a characteristic of American liberal jurisprudence as it tries to 'balance' competing values within a framework of fairness and justice.

[jholbo]

Jodi, I'm not saying that neutrality about the good has nothing to do to liberalism. I was merely objecting to your too-sweeping implication that somehow liberalism is inherently committed to it. I also wasn't inferring that the paper you heard had to be targeting mushy multiculturalism. I merely pointed out that the crude 'nutshell' version of the argument which you suggested was compelling against liberalism is only compelling against crude multiculturalism; so I inferred you were conflating them.

[jholbo]

May I also point out that 'emphasis on value pluralism' is very far from 'attempting to bootstrap a liberal principle of tolerance out of believe in value pluralism.'

baa has a point, however, about how something you might call 'crude Rawlsianism' could be the target here. (But of course to equate 'liberalism' with a dubious commitment by one liberal thinker, however prominent, would be rather dubious.)

abc requests to know which version of liberalism I am willing to defend. I am quite honestly attracted to a number of variations. Reading the Stanford Encyclopedia entry I am sort of going, 'I could go for that, or that, or that'. That is, I consider liberalism attractive as a cluster of views, often mutually opposed but independently impressive. But I suppose Ich bin ein Isaiah Berliner, to a considerable extent. This is actually a bit old fashioned of me, but I think the proper way to go is to eliminate some of the problems with his account. (Sometimes the man can be a bit glib and quick.) So for present purposes you may, um, peg me accordingly.

[Jodi]

If I've understood you correctly, you don't think that neutrality vis a vis different values is 'essential' to liberalism. Rather, you favor a combination of liberalisms, perhaps united under a value of negative liberty as theorized by Berlin. So, then maybe your account looks something like this: negative liberty is a primary human value; its instantiation in societies in the form of guaranteed rights (limitations on the state, division between public and private) is the result of history; liberalism, then, is worth protecting. So, the claim is basically that freedom is a value that liberals prioritize over and against the values that those of other political persuasians prioritize.

If this approximates your view, then it strikes me as a plausible defense of liberalism but not a liberal defense of liberalism. In other words, the defense is pragmatic (not quite communitarian as in a defense of 'our' values) ala Rorty.

[abb1]

Freedom! For the rich and for the poor the same exactly right to sleep under the bridge and to dine at the Ritz.

I'm with you: it's worth protecting. But will those guys sleeping under the bridge agree?

[Will Wilkinson]

What would a "liberal defense of liberalism" look like? Circular?

Berlin argues, as far as I can tell, that only some kind of value pluralism can make sense of observed moral reality. Value pluralism entails that there is no political system that perfectly and maximally exemplifies the good, because of the incompossibility of the various values. Liberty, however, though it is one value among many equally compelling values, and cannot, in isolation, be judged superior to other values, in fact tends to facilitate the imperfect realization of a wide diversity of different kinds of forms of life. Liberalism at least does less violence to the plurality of the good than the alternatives, and by trying to make space for pluralism, it diminishes conflict, and that's good. Liberalism, even when it aspires to the ideal of neutrality still rules things out, and some values are lost, which gives us reason to be mourn them. But it looks like we lose less, and have less reason to be mournful under liberalism than the major alternatives, which is a good reason to be a liberal.

That, I take it, is a pluralist defense of liberalism, which is what I take Berlin's defense to be. Because pluralism isn't liberalism, it's not a liberal defense of liberalism. And the argument isn't simply that liberalism "works," and thus isn't a "pragmatic" argument, strictly speaking. The argument, as far as I can see, is just that liberalism does less violence to fewer kinds of value than the alternatives, and because of that leads to less resentment and opposition than alternative social arrangements that do more violence to more values.

The annoying thing about Berlin's rather simple and straightforward argument is that there seems to me to be nothing wrong with it. We might harbor romantic aspirations for a world that exemplifies our own pet values to a maximal degree, in which case Berlin-style liberalism will seem deflationary or disappointing. But at least Berlin can see that, yes, indeed, we are missing out on something that might be beautiful and good and much much better along some dimension or other than is muddled old boring liberalism, just as jack-of-all trades misses out on the unique satisfactions of mastery. So he can acknowledge the merit of our totalizing aspirations, even while patiently pointing out all the violence to the moral fabric its realization must cause.

The best point of entry for a refutation of Berlin is the denial of value pluralism. But value pluralism is true! And, in any case, the liberal can always withdraw from metaphysical disputation and just point out, in Rawlsian fashion, that people cite and are moved by a plurality of reasons that are not obviously subsumable under any one master value.

Now, if one just knows that one's favored value is the master value, and that no price in suffering and death is too high, then there's no liberal argument that is going to talk you down. But that fact is hardly a compelling argument against liberalism. For it is not among the conditions for liberalism's adequacy that it be intellectually irresistable to the fanatical or the morally disturbed.

[abb1]

'Less harm' sounds like a good argument - if it's true. Seems to me that if you set 'liberty' high enough over everything else, you'll still create something quite ugly, not much better than communism or fascism.

This is probably a stupid question, but why not take all three: 'liberty', 'equality' and 'community' in no particular order and try to reconcile them the best you can?

I mean, why should 'liberty' trump 'equality'? It may make perfect sense for you because you're a smart and talented guy who will do well in the competition that unbound 'liberty' sets off, but a lot of people on the other side of the bell curve may not see it that way. They're likely to feel jealous, to feel that that a lot of violence to the plurality of the good is being done and all that. IOW, they might have a good reason to disagree.

Thanks.

[Will Wilkinson]

abb1, The point isn't to enjoy liberty for its own sake, although liberty, like much else, is good as such. I think Berlin's argument is basically this: It is in the distinctive nature of liberty to provide political space for the imperfect realization of goods other than liberty. Diminishing liberty, whether in favor of greater equality, community, or what have you, will restrict this space, and will thus do damage to some of the many values other than liberty that flourish under liberty. There are, of course, certain values other than equality that flourish under greater equality, too. So if you can increase equality without significantly decreasing freedom, then do it. Berlin wasn't exactly a laissez faire guy or a libertarian absolutist. However, we can't do any straightfoward moral mathematics in these cases, because of incommensurability problems, and so, when in doubt, its probably best to default to liberty on the assumption that it accomodates plurality better than the alternatives.

The Rawlsian liberal argument, in my probably too-pragmatic reading of it, is basically: First, secure liberty, because it's good for everybody for all sorts of reasons, including Berlin-like reasons about pluralism. Second, mitigate liberty to the extent that the people who would do worst under umitigated liberty are getting the best deal they could hope for, so that they have no good reason to complain about liberty. The result: not too much liberty & not too little. Just right.

[Jodi]

The question is how one gets from the is of value pluralism to the ought that multiple values need to be given a space to flourish. So, one can accept value pluralism and then simply say that it leads to nothing--that it by itself cannot lead one in a specific particular direction. I take this to be a very strong criticism of Berlin. The burden is then to show why plural values need to be recognized or protected.

The need for a liberal justification for liberalism isn't circular. In fact, most of the liberal theorists with whom I am familiar take the justification to be the crucial matter of interest (so, there was more academic debate over Rawls' original position than over other matters....) A liberal who defends free choice generally argues that liberalism is what free people would choose (Locke, for example, or Rawls' thought experiment). A liberal who says that might makes right (that liberalism is the result of the violent overthrow of the government) is saying that violence can be justified and used to good ends, that in times of revolution, individual rights can be overturned. Generally, liberals do not make this argument and when they do, they think that those whose rights are overturned are entitled to a justification (Gutmann and Thompson make this argument; a more sophisticated version comes from the German philosopher Rainer Forst).

[Will Wilkinson]

Jodi, We need to be careful to distinguish the Berlin-like metaethical claim that there are plural objective values, and the Rawls-like non-methaethical claim different people are animated by different value-conceptions. In the first case, there is no obvious is/ought gap. Suppose pleasure is the only good thing. From the "is" of that fact we can move straightaway to the claim that we "ought" to promote pleaure, because it is analytic that one ought to promote to the good. Similarly, if A, B, and C, are objective goods, then there is no problem with the move that we ought to promote A, B, and C. If they are may not be rank ordered or mutually maximized, then things are trickier. But it's not obviously an is/ought leap to claim that we ought to arrange things to enable the realization of more of these kinds of value than less.

If we tack the Rawls tack, nothing does follow from the fact of pluralism independent of some wider set of goals that are shared. Suppose most people want to realize their ends with a minimum of conflict or social strife, and that what most people want is relevant to political justification. Then liberalism starts to look good.

[jholbo]

Very interesting discussion. I have the flu, and a fever, so I am disqualified from contributing for a day or so. Let me just clarify that Jodi has not correctly understood me.

If I've understood you correctly, you don't think that neutrality vis a vis different values is 'essential' to liberalism.

This is a straightfoward enough point that the 'I think' is misplaced. How could it be that liberalism is committed to neutrality vis a vis different values? You couldn't set up the value of liberty over competing values, so you wouldn't be a liberal.

Rather, you favor a combination of liberalisms, perhaps united under a value of negative liberty as theorized by Berlin.

No, I didn't mean that I try to believe them all at once. I just think they are independently attractive as philosophies.

So, then maybe your account looks something like this: negative liberty is a primary human value; its instantiation in societies in the form of guaranteed rights (limitations on the state, division between public and private) is the result of history; liberalism, then, is worth protecting. So, the claim is basically that freedom is a value that liberals prioritize over and against the values that those of other political persuasians prioritize.

If this approximates your view, then it strikes me as a plausible defense of liberalism but not a liberal defense of liberalism. In other words, the defense is pragmatic (not quite communitarian as in a defense of 'our' values) ala Rorty.

No, it's merely not presuppositionless. What Will said.

[abb1]

Well, I'm not a philosopher and couldn't tell Berlin from schmerlin. But what I can see is political manifestation of this philosophy. Maybe it's not what Berlin had in mind, but Stalinism probably wasn't what Marx had in mind either. And what I see is that allowing a couple of lesbians to get a meaningless piece of paper from cityhall seems more important for you guys (generally speaking, maybe not you personally), than preventing and correcting the most revolting excesses of capitalist economy, not to mention horrible violence currently perpetrated under the banner of this philosophy. What gives?

I am sure theoretical egalitarianism can be defended just as convincingly and effectively as theoretical liberalism, but practical implementation should be the ultimate test of any theory - no?

[Rich Puchalsky]

abb1, you have a non-philosophical, pragmatic point, so I will attempt the same kind of answer. This line of attack on liberalism was tried in the last large Zizek thread here in a rather crude way by RIPope and a rather sophisticated way by Adam Kotsko. The answer need be nothing more than to point out that, no matter how bad you think life under liberalism is, life under other systems is worse. If the goal is living under the smallest possible amount of horrible violence and excess, no one can say that you will do better under some other system that has an actual historical record.

The counterattack on this is best carried out by someone like Chomsky, who points out that e.g. for the ex-USSR, a lot more people are dying under neoliberalism than were under late-stage Communism. Then you get into all sorts of arguments about whether Russian neoliberalism really is liberalism, whether there are local factors like the shock of losing superpower status, how much the Russian experience affects liberalism's record as a whole, etc.

But I also suspect that you're mixing up types of liberalism. You write that: "allowing a couple of lesbians to get a meaningless piece of paper from cityhall seems more important for you guys (generally speaking, maybe not you personally), than preventing and correcting the most revolting excesses of capitalist economy,". Are you now holding to a meaning of liberalism in which a union organizer is a liberal, or a neoliberal, or neither? Under what standard are we supposed to quantify how much political effort is spent in various areas by "liberals"?

[Will Wilkinson]

What are these "revolting excesses of capitalist economy" of which you speak?

Questions beforehand: Are they really (1) capitalist, (2) excesses, (3) revolting?

I am amused imagining huge banners with giant iconic pictures of Berlin and Rawls that are held high as the whooping warmongering "neo-liberals" descend for the slaughter.

[Jodi]

Will,
I think a problem does emerge with goods A, B, C. The problem has to do with the presumption that more is better. So, if society A is oriented around A, it is good. And society B oriented around B is good. But why would we say that a society oriented around A and B is better just because there is more? That suggests that there is something wrong with A, that A is lacking. But we already said that A is good. So, the fact that there are plural values (A...Z) doesn't mean that a society that recognizes more of them is better. We need an independent argument that says why more is better. So, we have the idea that one ought to promote the good and that there are multiple goods. But we don't have an argument that says one ought to promote all these goods. A subset will suffice (since they are goods). And the political question is how justify the partioning.

[Will Wilkinson]

Jodi, It's tricky with incommensurable and sometimes incompatible goods. But not so tricky. Pluralism isn't the view that we ought to maximize the good, and that it just so happens that there are a bunch of things that are good. In that case, if some cluster of goods works well together, and we'd get the most total generic good if we partioned things that way, then we ought to do that, even at the cost of all the other good. But the pluralist point is that there is NO generic good, and EACH kind of good has an independent claim on us not because it instantiates a generic goodmaking quality, but because of it's distinctive nature.

So pluralism isn't asking you to maximize the total amount of generic good, because there is no generic good. And it isn't asking you to maximize the number of kinds of good that are expressed, either. Not that more is better. It is asking you to recognize that each good is good, and as such has some claim on you.

If something is objectively good, then, other things equal, you should promote it. The tricky thing about pluralism is that other things are often not equal, since promoting one good can conflict with the expression of another. So sometimes we must regretfully forego one value in the service of another. Our decision is not algorithmic or rule-governed. There is no rule. One must take the full context of one's projects, plans, and character into account. Good moral choice in the face of plural goods is a matter of the accurate perception of the particularity of the situation, practical wisdom, and moral imagination.

But this kind of contextually embedded moral sensitivity and practical intelligence is not something that may be well expressed, or expressed at all, by the state. So the state, insofar as it is possible, ought to leave the hard problem of trading one value against another to its citizens. In practice, this means maintaining an social environment of liberty. Sometimes patterns of individual decision will lead to bad macro-effects, and there may be sufficient agreement, or overlap in judgments about the good, that society may want to use the state to help correct these, or prevent them. But they'll also be cautious, because the state functions as a backhoe in the many-colored garden of value, and usually you need a spade.

[abb1]

Rich, I am merely suggesting that overrating of the value of 'liberty' ('rights') is not necessarily as harmless as it may seem.

What happens is that in practice this philosophy is used to fortify one particular 'liberty': the right to own, acquire and accumulate property. Well, I don't think it's harmless. It causes very serious injury to other fundamental values: equality, obviously, and many others too. And at some point it turns into something that's sort of opposite of 'liberty'.

No, I don't think a union organizer is generally a liberal. You know what the stereotype for a union organizer is, don't you: a thug. I see a union organizer as more of a communist than a liberal.

Will: funny about the banner. You right, on a banner and without massive facial hair? - ridiculous.